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INTRODUCTION
In a phased mission, the functional organization of the
system changes during consecutive time periods. Some
examples of systems which are required to perform a phased
mission are space vehicles, public safety systems, and
military weapons systems. Reliability analysis for a phased
mission encounters complexities not present with just a
single phase, since the performance of a particular
component in one phase of a mission is not necessarily
independent of its performance in another phase. In a
recent paper. Bell [1975] modified and extended existing
methods for the analysis of phased missions, so as to
include an operational readiness (OR) phase, during which
the system functions solely to maintain its readiness for
later phases of active operation. The results were then
extended to systems which perform complex multi-objective
missions. This type of model is particularly applicable to
strategic weapons systems.
The work in this paper follows very closely the woifk of
Bell [1975], An example is analyzed, largely with graphical
techniques and diagrams, so as to avoid the complicated
mathematics which were required in the development of the
methodology of phased mission reliability analysis.

II. THE SLBM SYSTEM
A hypothetical submarine- launched ballistic missile
system (SLBM) , which was motivated by the Navy*s Fleet
Ballistic Missile system, was introduced by Bell [1975].
That hypothetical system is extended in this example to
include three missiles, each of which has a different
objective.
The SLBM system consists of the following components:
the submarine (S) which provides propulsion,
stability, power, and: household services.
the inertial navigation subsystem (N) which
provides information on platform position and orientation.
the communication subsystem (C) which provides
the link between the submarine and its command center.
the fire control subsystem (FC) which provides
trajectory information to each missile guidance computer.
the ejection subsystems (E1,E2,E3), one for each
missile, which launch the missiles from the submarine while
the latter is submerged.
the guidance component of each missile (G1,G2,G3)
which computes and transmits to the rocket engines the
control commands required to maintain the trajectory stored
within its memory, and triggers stage separation.
two internal power sources for each missile (VP1
and VS1, VP2 and VS2, VP3 and VS3)
.
a the first- and second-stage rocket engines of
each missile (RF1 and BS1, RF2 and RS2, RF3 and RS3)
.
• two first-stage igniters for each missile (IP1
and IS1, IP2 and IS2,; IP3 and IS3) .
the second-stage igniter of each missile (J1, J2,

J3) .
the warhead of each missile (W1 # W2, W3) .
The SLBM system has an operational readiness (OR) phase,
followed by five active phases for each objective. The
operational characteristics of the system can be summarized
as follows:
During the OR phase the submarine patrols its
assigned area, maintaining current position information with
the inertial navigation subsystem. Should the inertial
component fail, then position information can be obtained
periodically from a navigation satellite, which provides the
data necessary for calibration after repairs are completed.
The communication subsystem is used continually during this
phase for routine ship-shore message traffic. The fire
control subsystem is exercised periodically during the OR
phase tc monitor its status. Similarly, the performance of
the missile power sources and guidance components are
checked through routine tests. All components which are
monitored can be repaired or replaced if found to be failed
during the OR phase. Other failures go undetected. In
order for the system to be ready to commence active
operations, it must have submarine services and current
navigation information available, and it must be able to
receive the launch command via the communication subsystem.
The fire control phase for the first objective
commences when a launch command is received. All maintenance
actions cease, and launch preparations commence. The fire
control subsystem transmits trajectory data to the guidance
component of the first missile, and the submarine is
positioned for launch. The fire control phases for
subseguent objectives proceed in succession.
a During the Launch phase for each missile, the
submarine is held stable while the aissile is ejected,
severing its link with the platform and causing it to switch
to internal power. The power sources, although activated.

are not required to supply power during this phase.
The booster phase starts when the first-stage
engine ignites. This occurs as each missile breaks through
the surface of the water. The missile is then boosted along
its trajectory. The port igniter can be powered only by the
port power source, and the starboard igniter only by the
starboard power source, but one igniter is sufficient to
fire the engine. The guidance component, which can take
power from either source, must function throughout the
phase.
During the flight phase, the second-stage
igniter, second-stage engine, guidance component, and at
least one power source must function.
m Shutdown of the second-stage engine marks the
beginning of the terminal phase during which the warhead




There are two goals in this example. The first is to
determine the reliability of the SLBM system with respect to
each particular objective, that is, the probability that
each target is destroyed. The secc-nd goal is to analyze the
overall success of the total mission.
A. PHASE SEQUENCE DIAGRAM
As a tool in the analysis of this example, the phase
sequence diagram is used. For the SLBM system, the phase
sequence diagram is shown in Fig 1. It graphically depicts
the organizational sequence and numbering of phases. Each
phase is numbered with two digits. For example, the launch
phase of the first missile, which has objective 1, and is
active phase 2, is numbered phase 12. Following phase 12,
the phase sequence continues simultaneously up the first
branch for objective 1, and along the trunk for successive
objectives.
B. PHASE BLOCK DIAGRAMS
The functional organization of components within each
phase of the mission is graphically represented by a block
diagram. Fcr each phase, the block diagrams which
correspond to the description of the operational
characteristics of th;e SLBM system are shown in Fiq. 2.
11
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1 . Cut Cancel latioa
It is desireable, at this point, to simplify the
block diagrams by a procedure, suggested by Rubin [1964] and
Heisburg and Schmidt [1966], called cut cancellation. The
cancellations which are permitted by this technique are
shown in Fig 3. A simple rationale for these cancellations
can be illustrated referring to Fig 3. For example, it can
be seen that component G1 is required in the flight phase of
objective 1 (phase 14) , and that if it is not functioning
through the end of that phase, objective 1 can not be
accomplished. It can be reasoned that since the requirement
that G1 functions in phase 14 includes the requirement that
it does not fail in phases 1 1 or 13, G1 can therefore be
eliminated from further consideration in those earlier
phases. It is said that G1 first becomes relevant in phase
14.
A somewhat more complex situation occurs in the case
of the submarine (component S) , which is required for all
three objectives. With respect to objective 1, S first
becomes relevant in phase 12; with respect to objective 2,
in phase 22; and with respect to objective 3, in phase 32.
Cut cancellation is thus permitted, for component S, in
phases 00, 11, 21, and 31.
The resulting blocl»_ diagrams, following cut





























































































































2. Transforaa tion of the. Multi-phase Objective
The essence of the analysis of phased mission
reliability lies in the technique, suggested by Esary and
Ziehms [1975], of transforming a system with several phases
into an equivalent, synthetic, single-phase system. This
procedure makes it possible to compute reliability by
standard methods.
In-as-much as the performance of each component in a
particular phase is dependent on the performance in earlier
phases, the transformation involves replacing original
components with pseudo-components which represent
performance in each phase independent of performance in all
other phases.
A shortcoming of this technique is that the
transformation generates a large number of
pseudo-components, which may be unwieldy. Recognizing this.
Bell [1975] suggested a procedure for the reduction of
pseudo-components in a manner which retains the desirable
characteristics of th;e transformation.
The procedures of Esary and Ziehms [1975] and Bell
[1975] are modified for direct graphical application as
follows:
a. Having already performed cut cancellation,
which resulted in the phase block diagrams of Fig 4,
identify components which appear in more than one phase. In
the SLBM system, they are FC, S, VP1, VS1, VP2, VS2, VP3,
and 7S3. Now, as shown in Fig 5, circle the second and
subsequent appearances of each of those components. These

































































































b. Replace each of the ancircled components with
a pseudo-component numbered with the phase number where it
first appears. For example, replace the blocks
E1
in phase 12, with the blocks
S12 E12
Each of these blocks now specifically - represents a
pseudo-component which is required to survive only through
the end of the phase with which it is numbered.
c. Replace each of the circled components with
an equivalent series arrangement of independent
pseudo-components. Use lower case letters plus phase
numbers to represent a pseudo-component which is required to
function only during one phase. This step in the procedure,
referred to as pseudo-component expansion, is best
illustrated by the following example: The block
EC




It should be clear that the series arrangement of FC11,
which functions only through the end of phase 11, fc12,
which functions only during phase 12, and fc21, which
functions only during phase 21, is the equivalent, in phase
21, to the original component FC functioning through the end
of that phase. It should also be clear that the
pseudo-components are independent of one another. The





































































3 • Siaplif icatioa
The phase block diagrams can now be connected to
each other r in series, to create synthetic, equivalent,
single-phase systems. However, before proceeding, it is
desireable to simplify the block diagrams utilizing a
procedure properly known as ideopotent cancellation. This
can be done whereever a particular block will appear in
series with itself. Graphically, the idempotent law says,
for example, that
S12 S12 S12
The procedure for simplification is as follows:
a. Referring to Fig 6, identify those
pseudo-components, and those particular groups of
pseudo-components, which would be in series with themselves
if successive transformed phase block diagrams were
connected in series. These are candidates for
simplification. In the SLBM system, they are S12, s21, s22,
FC11, fc12, and fc21. Note that VP13, for example, is not a
candidate since it is in distinct and different groups of
pseudo-components in phases 13 and 14.
b. Remove the second and subsequent appearances
of each of the candidates. The resulting transformed and






























































It should be noted that following this simplification, the
transformed phase block diagrams are no longer,
phase-by-phase, exact equivalents of the original phase
block diagrams. However, when combined in series, as is
done in a subsequent step, the resulting synthetic,
single-phase systems are equivalent to the original
multi-phase systems.
C. RELIABILITY OF PSEUDO-COMPONENTS
The first goal in this SLBM example, as stated earlier,
is to determine the reliability of the system with respect
to each particular objective; that is, the probability that
each target is destroyed. In order to proceed, it is first
necessary to discuss the reliability of the
pseudo-components.
1 • Conditional Compon ent Phase Reliability
Represented by either upper case or lower case
letters, the two different types of pseudo-components have
reliabilities which are of different and distinct natures.
For the pseudo-components represented by lower case letters,
the reliability is the probability that the pseudo-component
will function only daring the particular phase indicated.
Thought of another way, it is the conditional probability
that the original component will function during that
particular phase, given that it was functioning at the start
of that phase. This conditional probability is referred to
as conditional component phase reliability.
24

2- Unconditiona l Coaponent Reliabilit y
The reliability of the pseudo-components represented
by upper case letters is the probability that the
pseudo-component survives through the end of the particular
phase indicated. This is the equivalent of the
unconditional probability that the original component
survives through the end of the first phase in which it is
relevant. This unconditional probability is referred to as
unconditional coaponent reliability. It might be noted that
the availability of each component at the commencement of
active operations is included in the unconditional component
reliability.
Hypothetical values for the reliability of each of














































































































The reliability of the SLBH system with respect to each
objective can be determined by working with the transformed
and simplified phase block diagrams of Fig 8. The
procedure consists of two parts: the first is construction
of the synthetic, equivalent, single-phase block diagram of
pseudo-components for each objective; the second part is
evaluation of the objective reliability using the block
diagram and given values for pseudo-component reliabilities.
1 • Objective Blgck Dia grams
The procedure for constructing the objective block
diagrams is actually a continuation of the transformation
process, and consists of the following steps:
a. Identify the sections of the phase sequence
diagram which are relevant to each objective. This step is
illustrated in Fig 9, the shaded portions of the phase
sequence diagrams representing the relevant phases.
b. Connect, in series, the transformed phase
block diagrams of all of the identified phases to form the
objective block diagram. For example, the block diagram of
objective 2 is shown in Fig. 10.
27





































































2. Objective Reliability Evaluation
Due to the presence of some pseudo-components more
than once (for example, VP23 and 7S23 in Fig 10) , the
objective block diagrams can not simply be treated as a
series of independent modules, which would have made
numerical evaluation, straight-forward. As an alternative,
it is possible to employ a well-known graphical technique of
structural reliability, which is based on a procedure called
pivotal decomposition (see, for example, Barlow and Proschan
[1975]) .
This technique is best illustrated by example, and
consists of the following steps:
a. Pull all of the independent blocks to the
front of the block diagram. In Fig 10, these are COO
through E22, RF23, and G2'4 through W25. This leaves the






b. Pivot on one of the pseudo-components which
cause the dependence,; say 7P23. To accomplish this, split
the block diagram into two branches by considering the block
diagrams which result if
30








(2) 7P23 always fails:
VS2>3 IS23 vs24
c. Since dependence still remains in the "VP23
always functions" branch, pivot again, this time on VS23.
Split the "VP23 always functions" branch into two branches
by considering the block diagrams which result if, in
addition to VP23 always functioning






(2) VS23 always fails:
IP23 vp24
Since all branches now contain independent modules, no more
pivoting is required- The result of these steps is
illustrated in Fig 11. As shown in the figure, just beyond
each pivot pcint and just below the branch lines, label each




(.950) (.950) (.950) (.950) (.950)
COO NOO FC11 S12 E12
(1.00) (.980) (.990) (.990) (.950)
fcl2 fc21 s21 s22 E22
(.990) (.900) (.950) (.990) (.950)




d. Above each branch line, in parentheses, write
the probability of the occurance of the event along that
branch. For example,* the probability that VP23 functions is
just its reliability, and the probability that it fails is
one minus the reliability.
e. Above each pseudo-component block, write the
probability of that block functioning' (the reliability of
the pseudo-component)
.
f. The blocks in Fig 11 can be reduced into
modules to simplify subsequent calculations. This is shown
in Fig 12, where modules are indicated by dotted lines, and
the reliability of each module is indicated in parentheses.
g. Multiply all of the probabilities
(reliabilities) leading to the end of each branch, and write
down the product. This is illustrated in Fig 12 by the
numbers in brackets.
h. The reliability of objective 2, denoted by
R2, can now be written down by summing the probabilities of
all of the branches. Thus
R2 = .553
Similarly, the reliabilities of objectives 1 and 3 can be





rcoo NOO FC11 S12
(.5621)
E12
fcl2 fc21 s21 s22 E22

























Having determined! the reliability or probability of
accomplishing each objective, the final goal is to analyze
the overall success of the total mission. This aspect of
the analysis may be achieved by answering the following
questions:
(1) What is the probability that any particular
number of objectives are accomplished on a mission?
(2) What is the expected or average number of
objectives that will be accomplished per mission?
1 • Successful Mission Outco mes
To begin answering these questions, first the
possible successful outcomes of a mission must be




objectives 1 and 2
objectives 1 and 3
objectives 2 and 3
objectives 1, 2, and 3
The probability of accomplishment, or reliability of
each objective alone has already been determined. Following
the same procedures which produced R1, R2, and R3, the joint
objective reliabilities can be found. It should be noted
36

that in set theory terminology, the joint objectives are
the intersections of the events which are single objectives.
Determining joint objective reliabilities consists of the
following steps:
a. Construct the joint objective block diagram
by connecting, in series, the transformed and simplified
phase block diagrams of the relevant phases, which in the
case of joint objective 1 and 2, for example, are indicated
by shading in the phase sequence diagram as follows:
b. Evaluate the joint objective reliability
which is denoted in the case of joint objective 1 and 2, for
example, as R12.
The possible successful outcomes and the
corresponding phase sequence diagrams are summarized in
Fig 13. A convenient tool from set theory, the Venn
diagram, is also shown for each outcome. The numerical
values for objective and joint objective reliabilities in
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Figure 13 - SUCCESSFUL MISSION OUTCOMES
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2. Mission Success Levels
The probability that any particular number of
objectives are accomplished on a mission can be written down
directly with the aid of the corresponding Venn diagrams.
These quantities, which correspond to varying levels of
mission success, are tabulated in Fig 14. It is noted that
in a more general application, where Venn diagrams might not
aPPly* other straight-forward approaches may be used (see
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3 • Expected Success
Osing the probability of each mission success level,
the average or expected number of successes per mission can
be determined by weighing each number by its probability of




accomplished = (0) (.250) + (1) (.145)
+ (2) (.296) + (3) (.309)
1^66
Alternative measures of mission success could be
examined in a similar manner. Particularly, objectives
could be weighted as to importance, and specific
combinations of accomplished objectives could be considered.
Bell [1975], for example, suggested an approach which could
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